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ABSTRACT
EMOTION BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STOIC VIEW
OF EMOTIONS AND A TEST OF SOME THEORIES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY
Amanda M. Fisher

Traditional CBT and third-wave CBT, namely ACT, are widely used
psychotherapy approaches. These psychotherapies have distinct philosophical and
theoretical roots and, in turn, emphasize divergent approaches to emotions. The current
study explored beliefs about emotions (emotion beliefs) associated with both approaches
to psychotherapy, the relationship between emotion beliefs and emotion outcomes, as
well as factors that mediate these relationships. Specifically, the study examined
correlations between emotion beliefs (emotion controllability beliefs, acceptance of
emotions, and emotion control values) and depression, anxiety, and anger. Correlation
coefficients were compared to determine significant differences in associations between
different emotion beliefs and emotion outcomes. It also examined whether emotion
beliefs predicted depression, anxiety, and anger. Finally, this study investigated if
emotion beliefs impacted depression, anxiety, and anger through different emotion
regulation mechanisms (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression).
Participants were undergraduate university students and adults in the general
population, who completed a series of questionnaires through an online survey platform.
Results demonstrated significant negative correlations between malleable emotion
controllability beliefs and negative emotion outcomes and nonjudgmental attitudes about
emotions and negative emotion outcomes. Emotion control values were not associated

with negative emotion outcomes. Emotion controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental
attitudes predicted all negative emotion outcomes examined in the present study, whereas
emotion control values only predicted anxiety. The effect of emotion beliefs on
depression and anxiety were partially mediated by cognitive reappraisal, but not
expressive suppression. The effect of emotion beliefs on anger was not mediated by
cognitive reappraisal. Limitations, future research, and implications for interventions are
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Stoic philosophy was designed to be practical by helping people lead a
meaningful life (Pigliucci, 2017). The Stoic philosophers postulated that individuals
could live a good life by cultivating good character and concern for others and nature.
Moreover, the good life entails some distinguishing features of humans, most importantly
the ability to reason (Murguia & Diaz, 2015). The Stoics indicated that a rational
disposition is humans’ default mode and is within an individual’s control, in that
everyone can act according to it. Externals termed “unnecessaries” are outside of
individual’s control and are not necessary for a good life.
The Stoics posited that emotions are, in essence, judgments about the present or
potential future situations (Graver, 2007). Because humans are reasoning beings, humans
are accountable for their emotions, even if they are not aware of their underlying
judgments. The Stoics claimed that certain emotions imply false judgments and that we
should seek to modulate these emotions, as they can hinder ethical behavior and wellbeing. Stoic philosophy posits that people should distinguish between what they can and
cannot control when faced with emotional disturbance. When people cannot change an
external situation, they should redirect emotions by reasoning. According to the Stoics,
reason plays a central role in well-being because optimal living necessitates acting in line
with humans’ rational nature (Murguia & Diaz, 2015). By reasoning, humans can make
sense of their environments.
Stoic philosophy has influenced the development of cognitive-behavioral
therapies, in particular, Ellis’ Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT; Robertson,
2010). One Stoic tenet that became central to REBT is that individuals’ beliefs about
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situations shape their psychological states (Murguia & Diaz, 2015). REBT posits that
irrational thinking determines emotional disturbance (DiGiuseppe et al., 2014).
According to REBT, people can change their dysfunctional emotions by analyzing and
changing their irrational thinking. Other Stoic ideas that influenced the development of
REBT are the dichotomy of control and the concept of emotional and behavioral
responsibility. REBT encourages individuals to accept responsibility for their thoughts,
emotions, and behaviors. REBT offers strategies, including endorsing rational beliefs, to
help people effectively control their dysfunctional emotions.
Although Stoic philosophers do not support eradicating all emotions, Stoics value
reason over emotion to pursue well-being and virtue. The Sentimentalists offered a
divergent philosophy that suggested that emotions, if properly channeled and morally
grounded, can be instrumental to human progress (TenHouten, 2019). The
Sentimentalists concluded that moral judgments and social behavior are determined by
emotions, not reason, but such judgments should also be subject to revision upon
reflection. The Sentimentalist’s philosophy of emotions aligns with modern psychology
research related to acceptance, mindfulness, and Eastern philosophy (Ford et al., 2017).
This body of research posits that adopting an accepting approach towards one’s
emotional experiences supports psychological well-being and suggests that acceptance of
negative emotions increases behaviors that help achieve our values and goals, and in the
end, reduce negative emotions.
Eastern philosophical traditions have influenced the development of third-wave
CBT approaches, including Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Shah, 2020).
ACT posits that emotional disturbance results from evaluative judgments that some
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emotions are unacceptable (Hayes et al., 1999; Predatu et al., 2020). REBT would posit
that non-acceptance would worsen emotional disturbances. Ellis posited that people could
have irrational beliefs about internal experiences that would, in turn, exacerbate those
emotions (DiGiuseppe et al., 2014). ACT and REBT specify that the nonacceptance of
some emotions leads people to suppress or avoid emotions. ACT would say that
suppression and experiential avoidance might reduce negative emotions temporarily but
lead to amplification of negative emotions in the long-term. ACT encourages individuals
to be mindful of their emotions, accept them nonjudgmentally, and let them run their
natural course (vs. trying to control them). REBT would recommend that people can
retain the preference that they not have negative emotions but accept that they do
experience the negative disturbed emotions.
In sum, REBT and ACT both aim to reduce emotional disturbance and promote
constructive acceptance. However, they do so in different ways. REBT guides individuals
to evaluate and change their irrational beliefs (that is give up the demand and replace it
with a preference), while ACT emphasizes not changing beliefs and accepting the
emotions in a nonjudgmental way (Matweychuk et al., 2019). REBT underscores
controlling emotional responses, whereas the non-control of emotional responses is
fundamental to ACT (Predatu et al., 2020). REBT and ACT are grounded in different
philosophies of emotions, and there is limited research examining these emotion beliefs
and their relationships to emotion regulation and emotional experiences.
Recently, researchers have become interested in empirically testing such
longstanding questions about how people can best approach their emotions. Specifically,
there has been interest in examining a wide range of beliefs that individuals hold about
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their own emotions (emotion beliefs) in the social, personality, and clinical psychology
research literatures. Individuals’ emotion beliefs might influence how effectively they
can regulate their emotions (Ford & Gross, 2018). The extended process model of
emotion regulation posits that beliefs about emotions impact an early stage of emotion
regulation during which individuals determine whether they will engage in emotion
regulation (Sheppes et al., 2015). This stage involves the detection of an emotion, an
evaluation of whether the experience requires regulation, and a decision to regulate an
emotion. Sheppes and colleagues (2015) hypothesize that emotion beliefs and attitudes
determine negative or positive evaluations of a regulated state and, consequently, the
decision to actively regulate emotions. Therefore, individuals’ emotion beliefs have
implications for what emotion regulation strategies are selected, the implementation of
emotion regulation strategies, and the success of emotion regulation efforts (Goodman et
al., 2020). Research supports that the habitual use of specific emotion regulation
strategies might be adaptive or maladaptive, as some strategies have been associated with
psychological health and others are associated with psychological distress (Wilson,
2019). Proactive, approach-oriented emotion regulation strategies (e.g., cognitive
reappraisal and problem-solving) have been associated with more positive psychological
health, whereas disengagement to regulate emotions (e.g., expressive suppression and
situational avoidance) have been associated with increased mental health problems
(Herman-Stahl et al., 1995; De France & Evans, 2020). Emotion beliefs might therefore
have implications for psychological well-being and psychopathology. This study aims to
empirically test relationships between emotion regulation and emotion beliefs grounded
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in Stoic philosophy and Eastern philosophies that shape modern psychotherapy
approaches. Emotion beliefs are a potential target for clinical interventions.
Ford and Gross (2018) offer a framework for conceptualizing emotion beliefs by
categorizing emotion beliefs in two superordinate categories: (1) beliefs about whether
emotions are controllable or uncontrollable (emotion controllability beliefs) and (2)
beliefs concerning whether emotions are good or bad (emotion values). They posit that
emotion beliefs can be general but vary across several subordinate features (e.g., specific
emotions, specific emotion intensities, specific emotion channels, specific contexts,
specific time courses, and specific targets). This theoretical framework presumes that
emotion controllability beliefs and emotion values are conceptually orthogonal. In the
psychology literature, beliefs about controllability and goodness (e.g., evaluative
judgments) of emotions have been studied and considered separately (Ford & Gross,
2019). Beliefs about the value of controlling emotions (emotion control values) is another
superordinate category of emotion beliefs that has been identified. The present study
examines emotion controllability beliefs, emotion values, and emotion control values and
the relationships between these beliefs and emotion regulation strategies.
Emotion controllability beliefs
Emotion controllability beliefs are influenced by Dweck’s socio-cognitive model of
implicit theories (Molden & Dweck, 2006; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Specifically, some
people believe that emotions are fixed, and individuals cannot control their emotions.
Others believe in the potential for change and that individuals can control their emotions.
These beliefs are considered implicit because they are not always explicitly expressed,
and these beliefs influence motivation to engage in challenging situations, implement
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self-regulation, and beliefs about the degree of control individuals have over themselves
(e.g., control over individual abilities and external situations; Kneeland et al., 2016a).
Implicit theories are measured using self-report questionnaires as opposed to measures of
implicit associations, such as the implicit association test (De Castella et al., 2015).
Emotion controllability beliefs have been associated with both acute emotional
outcomes (e.g., emotion intensity) and more cumulative emotional outcomes (e.g.,
psychological well-being) in general populations (Ford & Gross, 2019). Fixed emotion
beliefs have been associated with higher emotion intensity in response to the induction of
negative emotions in a laboratory environment and self-report scales (Kappes &
Schikowski, 2013; Tamir et al., 2007; Ford & Gross, 2019). Fixed emotion beliefs have
been associated with less favorable emotion experiences, decreased well-being, higher
depression, increased psychological distress, poorer life satisfaction, and more loneliness
in undergraduate students (Tamir et al., 2007; De Castella et al., 2013). During the
transition to college, higher fixed emotion beliefs were associated with fewer positive and
more negative emotions during a year (Tamir et al., 2007). Beliefs that emotions are
controllable have been associated with greater psychological well-being, lower rates of
depression, lower loneliness, and more willingness to confront negative affect in
undergraduate student samples. Beliefs that emotions are controllable were also
associated with fewer negative emotions and more positive emotions during a transition
to college.
Emotion regulation might mediate the link between emotion controllability beliefs
and emotion outcomes. Emotion controllability beliefs might influence the degree to
which people are motivated to engage in specific emotion regulation strategies (Kneeland
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et al., 2016a). Fixed emotion beliefs have been associated with less frequent use of
cognitive reappraisal in everyday life (De Castella et al., 2013; Tamir et al., 2007).
Beliefs that emotions are controllable have been associated with greater emotion
regulation self-efficacy and more frequent use of cognitive reappraisal, and these
relationships were not explained by emotion intensity (Tamir et al., 2007). Findings
regarding the relationship between fixed emotion beliefs and suppression are mixed. One
study found that fixed emotion beliefs are associated with decreased use of suppression,
while another study found no associations between fixed emotion beliefs and suppression
(Tamir et al., 2007; Schroder et al., 2015). It has been hypothesized that beliefs that
emotions are controllable are associated with more active, early-stage attempts at selfregulation that aim to change emotions early on in the emotion generative process, such
as cognitive reappraisal (Kneeland et al., 2016a; Gross, 1998). It is also possible that
these beliefs are associated with more emotion regulation efforts overall. Conversely,
individuals with fixed emotion beliefs may engage in late-stage emotion regulation
efforts later in the emotion generative process, such as expressive suppression.
Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are central to the etiology and
maintenance of psychopathology (Kneeland et al., 2016a). In a clinical context,
encouraging individuals to believe that emotions are controllable might be beneficial.
Such a belief system might decrease individuals’ reliance on maladaptive emotion
regulation strategies or a limited range of strategies. This belief system might promote an
active coping stance and increase motivation to engage in emotion regulation. Moreover,
emotion controllability beliefs are an attractive psychotherapy target because they are
malleable (Molden & Dweck, 2006; Ford & Gross, 2019).
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Few studies have examined emotion controllability beliefs in clinical populations.
In one study, patients with a social anxiety disorder who endorsed fixed emotion
controllability beliefs reported higher levels of perceived stress and anxiety, higher levels
of negative affect, and lower levels of self-esteem (De Castella et al., 2014). Fixed
control emotion beliefs were not correlated with positive emotions. Furthermore, emotion
controllability beliefs explained unique variance in social anxiety disorder severity. In a
randomized controlled trial of cognitive-behavioral therapy for social anxiety disorder,
fixed emotion controllability beliefs of anxiety indirectly explained changes in symptoms
and uniquely predicted treatment outcomes when controlling for other maladaptive
beliefs and baseline social anxiety (De Castella et al., 2015).
Although some research has examined relationships between emotion
controllability beliefs with depression and anxiety, there is no research on emotion
controllability beliefs and anger. In fact, research on cognitive processes related to anger
has been sparse but increasing in recent years (Martin & Dahlen, 2007). Martin and
Dahlen (2007) highlight five cognitive processes that are relevant in the anger literature.
One cognitive process identified is catastrophic evaluations, which means appraising
events as highly negative and one’s coping skills as inadequate. It is therefore possible
that individuals with anger problems perceive their ability to cope with negative emotions
as inadequate and hold fixed emotion controllability beliefs however more research is
needed to examine emotion controllability beliefs and anger.
Emotion controllability beliefs might also have implications for hypothetical
treatment preference. Undergraduate students who chose a medication-only mental health
treatment option endorsed more fixed emotion beliefs than those who chose an individual
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therapy option and a combined individual therapy and medication option (Schroder et al.,
2015; Reffi et al., 2020). Such findings suggest that those with fixed emotion beliefs
might endorse genetic essentialist beliefs. The endorsement of biomedical models of
mental health has been linked to pessimism about recovery and self-fulfilling prophecies
that could impede psychotherapy progress (Kvaale et al., 2013).
Emotion values
The concept that negative emotions are disruptive, problematic, and controllable is
widespread in the field of psychology (Gratz & Tull, 2010). However, mindfulness and
emotion acceptance research postulates that efforts to control negative emotions might
not be effective or healthy and could have paradoxical effects. For example, valuing
controlling emotions might be associated with negative evaluations of some emotions. A
third wave, acceptance-based approach, asserts that all emotions are functional and
encourages awareness, understanding, and acceptance of all emotions. Research in
general and clinical populations suggests that less emotion-acceptance is related to an
increase in negative emotional experiences and might have implications for
psychopathology. In one study, greater acceptance of mental experiences predicted lower
negative emotional responses to stress with a standardized stressor and in daily life in a
general population (Ford et al., 2017). A meta-analysis concluded that negative cognitive
and affective evaluations of negative emotional experiences and depression (e.g.,
emotions are harmful, intolerable) were associated with more depression with a medium
to large effect (Yoon et al., 2018). This effect size was larger than previously observed
associations between emotion regulation strategies and depression.
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Relationships between emotion acceptance and emotion regulation remain unclear. It
is possible that emotion-acceptance alters emotion experiences in the same way emotion
regulation does and can be considered a response focused emotion regulation strategy
(Ford et al., 2017; Kohl et al., 2012; Wolgast et al., 2011). However, emotion acceptance
also represents an emotion belief regarding the acceptability of emerging emotions.
Emotion acceptance reflects a mental stance not to change emotions. In contrast, emotion
regulation is defined as an active process to shift current emotions to emotion goals
(Tamir et al., 2020). Mindfulness and acceptance literature posits a distinction between
attempts to control emotion experience and control emotion expression (Gratz & Tull,
2010). Implications for clinical interventions include focusing on adaptive ways to
respond to emotional distress rather than controlling emotions or decreasing emotional
arousal.
Another category of emotion beliefs related to emotion values is emotion control
values (Goodman et al., 2020; Mauss et al., 2010). High emotion control values refer to
the belief that people should monitor emotional expression and control their emotions.
People who do not value emotion control believe it is acceptable to experience and
express emotions. Because people with social anxiety disorder hold themselves to
unreasonably high social standards and demonstrate concern about displaying perceived
character flaws, emotion control values are particularly relevant to social anxiety disorder
(Goodman et al., 2020). Goodman and colleagues (2020) found that participants with
social anxiety disorder had higher emotion control values and that emotion control values
were positively associated with daily attempts at emotion suppression. Research has
demonstrated that people with social anxiety disorder have endorsed stronger beliefs
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about emotional control than individuals without a current psychiatric disorder (Goodman
et al., 2020). Moreover, emotion control values vary across cultures and could be relevant
to anger expression. Past research demonstrated that emotional control is highly valued in
Asian cultures (Murata et al., 2013). Mauss and colleagues (2010) found that AsianAmerican and European-American participants’ differences in emotion control values
partially mediated cultural group differences in anger experience and expressions after an
anger provocation. Asian-American participants endorsed smaller increases in anger
experiences and less intense anger expressions than European-American participants.
However, autonomic physiological responses did not differ between these cultural
groups.
Hypotheses
Although emotion controllability beliefs have been associated with psychological
well-being, previous research has not studied emotion beliefs in a range of specific
emotion domains using clinical measures. Also, the Stoic, CBT, and REBT make
different statements about emotion-acceptance and emotion control than the third wave
approaches such as ACT. The present study attempts to test hypotheses based on the
different predictions of these different theoretical positions. This study examined the
mediating role of dispositional tendencies to regulate emotions (i.e., the tendency to
consistently implement an emotion regulation strategy across situational contexts). The
present study examined individuals’ emotion controllability beliefs and their relationship
to emotion outcomes as potentially mediated by the tendency to engage in specific
emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression). Emotion
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controllability beliefs represent a facet of Stoic philosophy of emotions that is
foundational to REBT and CBT.
The present study also examined the effect of emotion acceptance (nonjudgmental
attitudes about emotions) on emotion outcomes and emotion regulation. Nonjudgmental
attitudes measure a facet of emotion beliefs grounded in the Eastern philosophical
traditions, which have influenced the development of third-wave CBT approaches, such
as ACT.
The hypotheses for the present study are as follows:
(1) A greater endorsement that emotions are controllable (malleable emotion
controllability beliefs) would be associated with lower depression, anxiety, and anger
scores. This hypothesis is theoretically consistent with Stoic philosophy, REBT, and CBT
that posit that changing irrational beliefs and cognitive distortions can lead to decreases
in dysfunctional emotions.
(2) Increased endorsement of nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions would be
associated with lower depression, anxiety, and anger scores. This hypothesis is
theoretically consistent with third-wave CBT interventions, including ACT, which
postulate that acceptance of emotions contributes to psychological well-being.
(3) Higher endorsement of emotion control values would be associated with higher
depression, anxiety, or anger scores. This hypothesis is theoretically consistent with thirdwave CBT interventions, including ACT, which postulate that efforts to control negative
emotions can lead to increased experiences of negative emotions.
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(4) Higher endorsement of emotion controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental
attitudes about emotions and lower endorsement of emotion control values would
negatively predict emotion outcomes (depression, anxiety, and anger scores).
(5) Emotion regulation strategies, including cognitive reappraisal and expressive
suppression, would partially mediate the relationship between emotion controllability
beliefs and emotion outcomes (depression, anxiety, and anger).
(6) Emotion regulation strategies, including cognitive reappraisal and expressive
suppression, would partially mediate the relationship between nonjudgmental attitudes
towards emotions and emotion outcomes (depression, anxiety, and anger scores).
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METHOD
Participants and Procedure
Participants consisted of 315 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology
courses who received course credit for participation. Additional participants were
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and social media sites such as Facebook.
Measures
Emotion controllability. Personal beliefs about the controllability of emotions
were assessed using a variant of the Implicit Beliefs about Emotions Scale (Tamir et al.,
2007; De Castella et al., 2013). The original scale consists of four items that measure
general beliefs about emotion malleability. Two items measure incremental beliefs, and
two items measure entity beliefs. The items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale.
Incremental beliefs refer to beliefs that emotions are malleable and controllable. Entity
beliefs refer to beliefs that emotions are fixed and unchangeable. Entity belief items were
reverse scored so that higher implicit belief scores reflect an incremental theory, and
lower scores reflect an entity theory of emotions. The personal scale is similar to the
general scale, except items assess first-person beliefs about the ability to control one’s
own emotions. The personal scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency in a
sample of undergraduate psychology students (α = .75). The personal scale was used
because past research indicates that individuals’ beliefs about their ability to control their
own emotions are a better predictor of psychological well-being and health than their
beliefs about the ability of people in general to control emotions. Items were as follows:
“If I want to, I can change the emotions that I have,” “I can learn to control my
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emotions,” “The truth is, I have very little control over my emotions,” and “No matter
how hard I try, I can’t change the emotions that I have.”
Emotion acceptance. Acceptance of emotions was measured using the nonjudgment subscale of the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al.,
2006). The FFMQ is a 39-item scale developed through factor analysis using items from
five independently developed mindfulness scales (Williams et al., 2014). The FFMQ
measures five mindfulness skill subscales. The non-judgment scale consists of eight items
measured using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5
(very often or always true). This scale measures the acceptance of both emotions and
thoughts. Past research supports that, although this scale consists of items related to
acceptance of both emotions and thoughts, acceptance of emotions and acceptance of
thoughts are not empirically distinct, and both sets of items are highly correlated and had
comparable associations to psychological health (Ford et al., 2017). This scale
demonstrated good internal consistency in a sample of undergraduate psychology
students (α = .87). Examples of items include “I criticize myself for having irrational or
inappropriate emotions,” and “I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling.”
Emotion control values. Emotion control values were measured using the
Emotion Control Values-Self-report measure (Mauss et al., 2010). The scale consists of
six items that measure beliefs about emotion control and expression measured on a 10point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). Positive
correlations with emotion suppression and negative correlations with the tendency to vent
emotions indicate good construct validity (Goodman et al., 2020). This scale
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency in a sample of European-American
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undergraduate students (α = .71) and questionable internal consistency in a sample of
Asian-American undergraduate students (α = .64). Items are as follows. “People should
not express their emotions openly.” “It is wrong for people to always display how they
feel.” “People should let out pent up emotions.” “People should show their emotions
when overcome with strong feelings.” “People, in general, should control their emotions
more,” and ‘‘I think it is appropriate to express emotions, no matter whether negative or
positive.”
Depression. Depression was measured using the depression module of the Patient
Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001; Spitzer et al., 1999). The PHQ-9 is a
9 item self-report measure designed to assess probable cases of major depressive disorder
and to assess symptom severity. The items represent DSM-IV criteria that are measured
on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day). As a severity
measure, scores can range from 0 to 27, with scores of >5, >10, >15, and >20 representing
mild, moderate, moderately severe, and severe depression symptom levels, respectively.
This measure demonstrated excellent internal reliability in primary care patient sample (α
= .89) and an obstetrics-gynecology patient sample (α = .86). This measure also
demonstrated criterion validity, construct validity, and external validity.
Anxiety. Anxiety was measured using the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Scale
(GAD-7; Lowe et al., 2008; Kroenke et al., 2007; Spitzer et al., 2006). The GAD-7 is a 7
item self-report measure designed to assess probable cases of generalized anxiety
disorder and to assess symptom severity. The items represent the most prominent criteria
for generalized anxiety disorder and are measured on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from
0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day). As a severity measure, scores range from 0 to 21,
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with scores of >5, >10, and >15 representing mild, moderate, and severe anxiety
symptom levels, respectively. The GAD-7 demonstrated high reliability and validity in
primary care patients and the general population.
Anger. Anger was assessed using the short form of the Anger Disorders Scale
(ADS-SF; DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2004), an 18 item self-report measure of dysfunctional
trait anger. Items are measured on a 5-point Likert-scale that varies based on the item,
with some ranging in terms of frequency, and others in terms of intensity (from 1
[never/not at all] to 5 [almost every day/always]), with higher scores indicating more
dysfunctional anger. The ADS-SF has excellent internal consistency and correlates 0.96
with the 72-item long form of the ADS. Examples of items include “I have been so angry
that I became aware of my heart racing,” and “When I get angry, I yell or scream at
people.”
Emotion Regulation. Emotion regulation was assessed using the Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), a 10-item scale designed to measure a respondent’s
tendency to regulate their emotions using cognitive reappraisal and expressive
suppression (Gross & John, 2003). Cognitive reappraisal is defined as changing the way
one thinks about a situation to change its emotional impact (Gross, 2002). An example of
an item that measures cognitive reappraisal is, “when I want to feel more positive
emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m thinking about.” Expressive
suppression is defined as attempting to inhibit expressions of emotions. An example of an
item that measures expressive suppression is, “I keep my emotions to myself.” Items are
measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). The ERQ is evidenced to have strong psychometric properties, cognitive
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reappraisal (α = .89-.90), and expressive suppression (α = .76-.80) subscales have
acceptable to excellent levels of internal consistency in general community samples
(Preece et al., 2019).

Procedure
Participants completed the measures above using a link to an anonymous online
Qualtrics survey, which was preceded by a page explaining instructions collecting
informed consent. We posted a note that included a link to the survey to recruit
participants on various social media sites.
Data Analysis
We first examined for missing data. Visual inspection was initially used to
remove eight cases with many missing items (greater than 25%). A series of linear
regressions were conducted to examine relationships between demographic variables,
including age and gender, and outcome measures. Next, one-way ANOVAs were used to
test sample group differences in outcome variables.
Correlations were run to test associations between outcome variables to address
hypotheses one, two, and three. Fisher’s r to z transformation was conducted to explore
comparisons between correlation coefficients associated with emotion beliefs.
Hierarchical regression analyses controlling for significant covariates were run to test the
predictive value of emotion beliefs on depression, anxiety, and anger (hypothesis 4). The
regression assumption of independence of observations was checked using the DurbinWatson statistic. The regression assumptions of linearity between the dependent variable
and each of the independent variables and the dependent variable and the independent
variables collectively were tested by observing partial regression plots and scatterplots of
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studentized residuals and unstandardized predicted values respectively. Regression
assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity were examined by
observing a histogram with superimposed normal curve and a P-P Plot, tolerance, and
VIF values, and a scatter plot of the residuals, respectively. Outliers were detected using
casewise diagnostics and studentized deleted residuals, and leverage and influential
points were also detected. Several simple mediation analyses were performed using
PROCESS controlling for gender, age, and data source to test hypotheses 5 and 6.
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RESULTS
General characteristics of sample
There were 315 participants in the study, and eight participants did not finish the
study. Two hundred twenty-one participants (72.0%) were female, 80 participants
(26.1%) were male, and 6 participants (2.0%) identified their gender as other (e.g.,
agender, non-binary, and gender-nonconforming). Thirty-eight participants (12.4%) were
African American, 171 participants (54.7%) were Caucasian, 22 participants (7.2%) were
Asian, 12 participants (3.9%) were South Asian, 46 participants (15.0%) were Hispanic,
3 participants (1.0%) were Native American, and 15 participants (4.9%) identified their
ethnicity as “other.” The mean age was 24.6 (SD = 11.09).
A series of linear regressions were conducted to examine the relationships
between demographic variables and outcome measures. A linear regression established
that age significantly predicted nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, (ß = .29, F(1,
305) = 28.45, p < .001), depression (ß = -.26, F(1, 305) = 21.45, p < .001), anxiety (ß = .29, F(1, 305) = 27.73, p < .001), anger (ß = -.18, F(1, 305) = 9.58, p = .002), cognitive
reappraisal (ß = .11, F(1, 305) = 3.95, p = .05), and expressive suppression (ß = -.16,
F(1, 305) = 7.64, p = .006). Older age was associated with increased nonjudgmental
attitudes, lower depression, lower anxiety, lower anger, increased use of cognitive
reappraisal, and less use of expressive suppression. Implicit beliefs about emotions were
statistically significantly different across genders, Welch’s F(2, 13.05) = 5.56, p = .018;
males endorsed more fixed beliefs of emotions in comparison to females. Emotion
control values were statistically significantly different across genders, F(2, 304) = 4.37, p
= .013; males endorsed higher emotion control values in comparison to females.
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Depression was also statistically significantly different across genders, F(2, 304) = 3.38,
p = .04; males endorsed lower depression in comparison to females.
One-way ANOVAs were used to test sample group differences in outcome
variables. The Tukey HSD post-hoc test was used to examine differences between
samples when equal variances are assumed, and the Games-Howell post hoc test was
used to examine differences when equal variances were not assumed. Overall, there were
significant differences in nonjudgmental attitudes between groups, Welch’s F(2, 75.18) =
6.21, p = .003. Participants in the Mturk sample (M = 28.63, SD = 8.66) were
significantly more nonjudgmental than participants in the undergraduate (M = 22.27, SD
= 6.85) and social media samples (M = 23.46, SD = 8.12), and the effect size of these
differences was approximately medium (Cohen’s f = 0.22). There were overall significant
differences in depression between groups, F(2, 304) = 9.65, p < .001; the effect size of
these differences was approximately medium (Cohen’s f = 0.26). Participants in the
Mturk sample (M = 13.08, SD = 5.28) reported significantly lower levels of depression
in comparison to participants in the undergraduate (M = 17.37, SD = 6.60) and social
media (M = 17.20, SD = 6.56) samples. There were overall significant differences in
anxiety between groups, Welch’s F(2, 86.20) = 12.65, p < .001); the effect size of these
differences was approximately medium (Cohen’s f = 0.26). Participants in the Mturk
sample (M = 10.96, SD = 4.79) reported significantly lower levels of anxiety in
comparison to participants in the undergraduate (M = 14.93, SD = 6.16) and social media
samples (M = 14.10, SD = 6.14). Given these differences, age, gender, and data source
were entered as covariate variables in hierarchical linear regression analyses.
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Preliminary analyses
Preliminary analyses examined correlations between independent and dependent
variables in the study. These correlations appear in Table 1. Emotion controllability
beliefs were positively correlated with nonjudgmental attitudes (r = .33, p < .001) and
cognitive reappraisal (r = .40, p < .001) and negatively correlated with depression (r = .31, p < .001), anxiety (r = -.36, p < .001), and anger (r = -.41, p < .001). Nonjudgmental
attitudes were positively correlated with cognitive reappraisal (r = .18, p < .001); namely,
endorsing more nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions was associated with endorsing
more frequent use of cognitive reappraisal. Nonjudgmental attitudes were negatively
correlated with depression (r = -.56, p < .001), anxiety (r = -.58, p < .001), anger (r = .52, p < .001), and expressive suppression (r = -.23, p < .001). Emotion controllability
values were negatively correlated with cognitive reappraisal (r = -.14, p < .001).
Depression was positively correlated with anxiety (r = .78, p < .001), anger (r = .52, p <
.001), and expressive suppression (r = .20, p < .001) and negatively correlated with
cognitive reappraisal (r = -.26, p < .001). Anxiety was positively correlated with anger (r
= .57, p < .001) and expressive suppression (r = .17, p < .001) and negatively correlated
with cognitive reappraisal (r = -.30, p < .001). Anger was positively correlated with
expressive suppression (r = .29, p < .001) and negatively correlated with cognitive
reappraisal (r = -.18, p < .001).
These results supported hypothesis 1, because emotion controllability beliefs scores
were negatively associated with depression, anxiety, and anger scores. High emotion
controllability belief scores refer to malleable emotion controllability beliefs, whereas
low emotion controllability belief scores refer to fixed emotion controllability beliefs.
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Thus, greater endorsement of fixed emotion beliefs was associated with greater
endorsement of these disturbing emotions.
These results also supported hypothesis 2 because nonjudgmental attitudes about
emotions were negatively associated with depression, anxiety, and anger scores. The
hypothesis that high emotion control values will be associated with higher depression,
anxiety, or anger scores (hypothesis 3) was not supported.
Comparing correlation coefficients
Fisher’s r to z transformation and an asymptotic z-test were conducted to compare
correlations between emotion beliefs and emotion outcomes. Nonjudgmental attitudes
were significantly more correlated with depression in comparison to emotion
controllability beliefs (z-score = 4.44, p < .001). Nonjudgmental attitudes were
significantly more correlated with anxiety than emotion controllability beliefs (z-score =
4.00, p < .001). Nonjudgmental attitudes were significantly more correlated with anger in
comparison to emotion controllability beliefs (z-score = 1.97, p = .05).
Predictors of emotion outcomes
A two-stage hierarchical linear regression model was tested to determine if
emotion control values, emotion controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes
improved the prediction of depression over demographic variables. Age, gender, and data
source were entered at stage one of the regression. The emotion belief variables (emotion
control values, emotion controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes) were entered
at stage two. As assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals
against the predicted values, there was linearity. There was independence of residuals, as
assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.93. Homoscedasticity was present and was
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assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized
predicted values. There was no evidence of multicollinearity, as assessed by tolerance
values greater than 0.1. There were two studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3
standard deviations. Because there were no leverage values greater than 0.2 and values
for Cook's distance above 1, cases with studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3
standard deviations were not removed. The assumption of normality was met as assessed
by Q-Q Plot.
The hierarchical linear regression revealed that, at stage one, age, gender, and date
source contributed significantly to the regression model and accounted for 9.3% of the
variation in depression, F(5, 301) = 6.17, p < .001. Adding emotion control values,
emotion controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes explained an additional
27.2% of the variance and the change in R2 was statistically significant, R2 = .37, F(8,
298) = 21.44, p < .001; adjusted R2 = .35. See Table 2 for full details on each model in
the hierarchical linear regression. When all independent variables were in the model,
emotion controllability beliefs (ß = -.12, t = -2.44, p = .02) and nonjudgmental attitudes
about emotions (ß = -.50, t = -9.53, p < .001) significantly predicted depression. Emotion
control values did not significantly predict depression (ß = -.09, t = -1.80, p = .07).
A two-stage hierarchical linear regression model was tested to determine if
emotion control values, emotion controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes
improved the prediction of anxiety over demographic variables. Age, gender, and data
source were entered at stage one of the regression. The emotion belief variables (emotion
control values, emotion controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes) were entered
at stage two. As assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals
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against the predicted values, there was linearity. There was independence of residuals, as
assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.11. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed
by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized predicted
values. There was no evidence of multicollinearity, as assessed by tolerance values
greater than 0.1. There were two studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard
deviations. Because there were no leverage values greater than 0.2 and values for Cook's
distance above 1, cases with studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard
deviations were not removed. The assumption of normality was met, as assessed by Q-Q
Plot.
The hierarchical linear regression revealed that, at stage one, age, gender, and date
source contributed significantly to the regression model and accounted for 8.7% of the
variation in anxiety, F(5, 301) = 6.81, p < .001. Adding emotion control values, emotion
controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes explained an additional 30% of the
variance and the change in R2 was statistically significant, R2 = .40, F(8, 298) = 24.98, p <
.001; adjusted R2 = .39. See Table 3 for full details on each model in the hierarchical
linear regression. When all independent variables were in the model, emotion
controllability beliefs (ß = -.18, t = -3.58, p < .001), nonjudgmental attitudes about
emotions (ß = -.50, t = -9.73, p < .001), and emotion control values (ß = -.10, t = -2.16, p
= .03) significantly predicted anxiety.
A two-stage hierarchical linear regression model was tested to determine if
emotion control values, emotion controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes
improved the prediction of anger over age, gender, and data source. Age, gender, and
data source were entered at stage one of the regression. The emotion belief variables
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(emotion control values, emotion controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes)
were entered at stage two. There was linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and
a plot of studentized residuals against the predicted values. There was independence of
residuals, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.02. There was homoscedasticity,
as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized
predicted values. There was no evidence of multicollinearity, as assessed by tolerance
values greater than 0.1. There were three studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3
standard deviations. Because there were no leverage values greater than 0.2 and values
for Cook's distance above 1, cases with studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3
standard deviations were not removed. The assumption of normality was met, as assessed
by Q-Q Plot.
The hierarchical linear regression revealed that, at stage one, age, gender, and date
source contributed significantly to the regression model and accounted for 5.4% of the
variation in anger, F(5, 301) = 3.45, p < .01. Adding emotion control values, emotion
controllability beliefs, and nonjudgmental attitudes explained an additional 30% of the
variance and the change in R2 was statistically significant, R2 = .35, F(8, 298) = 20.42, p <
.001; adjusted R2 = .34. See Table 4 for full details on each model in the hierarchical
linear regression. Controlling for the covariates, emotion controllability beliefs (ß = -.29,
t = -5.69, p < .001) and nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions (ß = -.41, t = -7.68, p <
.001) significantly predicted anger. Emotion control values did not significantly predict
anger (ß = .01, t = -.10, p = .92). The hypothesis that emotion controllability beliefs,
nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and emotion control values would significantly
predict emotion outcomes (depression, anxiety, and anger scores; hypothesis 4) was
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partially supported. These results suggest that emotion controllability beliefs and
nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions predict depression, anxiety, and anger, and
emotion control values predict anxiety but not depression and anger.
Mediation
It was hypothesized that the relationships between emotion beliefs and
depression, anxiety, and anger were mediated by emotion regulation processes,
specifically cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. Several simple mediation
analyses were performed using PROCESS, controlling for gender, age, and data source.
Mediation analysis with depression as a dependent variable
The first mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of depression, the
independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and a mediator of cognitive
reappraisal (Figure 1). For the total effect, the regression of emotion controllability
beliefs on depression was significant, b = -.59, t(302) = -5.20, p < .001. For the indirect
effects, the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on cognitive appraisal was
significant, b = .93, t(303) = 7.37, p < .001. It was found that cognitive reappraisal
partially mediated the relationship between emotion controllability beliefs and
depression, indirect effect = -.12, SE = .06, 95% CI [-.24, -.02]. These results support the
hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would partially mediate the relationship between
emotion controllability beliefs and depression (hypothesis 5). The directional relationship
in this mediator model was examined by reversing the independent and dependent
variables in another mediator model, so that emotion controllability beliefs was the
dependent variable and depression was the independent variable. The mediator model
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remained significant, and cognitive reappraisal partially mediated the effect of depression
on emotion controllability beliefs.
The second mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of depression, the
independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and a mediator of expressive
suppression (Figure 2). For the total effect, the regression of emotion controllability
beliefs on depression was significant, b = -.59, t(302) = -5.20, p < .001. Indirect effects:
the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on expressive suppression was
significant, b = -.18, t(303) = -2.04, p = .04. Expressive suppression did not mediate the
relationship between emotion controllability beliefs and depression, indirect effect = -.04,
SE = .02, 95% CI [-.09, .005]. These results do not support the hypothesis that expressive
suppression would partially mediate the relationship between emotion controllability
beliefs and depression (hypothesis 5).
The third mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of depression, the
independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes, and a mediator of cognitive reappraisal
(Figure 3). Total effect: the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on depression
was significant, b = -.47, t(302) = -11.08, p < .001. Indirect effects: the regression of
nonjudgmental attitudes on cognitive appraisal was significant, b = .17, t(303) = 2.86, p <
.01. Cognitive reappraisal partially mediated the relationship between nonjudgmental
attitudes and depression, indirect effect = -.02, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.05, -.003]. These
results support the hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would partially mediate the
relationship between nonjudgmental attitudes and depression (hypothesis 6). The
directional relationship in this mediator model was examined by reversing the
independent and dependent variables in another mediator model, so that nonjudgmental
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attitudes about emotions was the dependent variable and depression was the independent
variable. Cognitive reappraisal did not mediate the effect of depression on nonjudgmental
attitudes.The fourth mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of depression,
the independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes, and a mediator of expressive
suppression (Figure 4). Total effect: the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on
depression was significant, b = -.47, t(302) = -11.08, p < .001. Indirect effects: the
regression of nonjudgmental attitudes on expressive suppression was significant, b = -.13,
t(303) = -3.52, p < .001. Expressive suppression did not mediate the relationship between
nonjudgmental attitudes and depression, indirect effect = -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.04,
.002]. These results do not support the hypothesis that expressive suppression would
partially mediate the relationship between nonjudgmental attitudes and depression
(hypothesis 6).
Mediation analysis with anxiety as a dependent variable
The fifth mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anxiety, the
independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and a mediator of cognitive
reappraisal (Figure 5). Total effect: the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on
depression was significant, b = -.64, t(302) = -6.27, p < .001. Indirect effects: the
regression of emotion controllability beliefs on cognitive appraisal was significant, b =
.93, t(303) = 7.37, p < .001. Cognitive reappraisal partially mediated the relationship
between emotion controllability beliefs and anxiety, indirect effect = -.13, SE = .05, 95%
CI [-.24, -.03]. These results support the hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would
partially mediate the relationship between emotion controllability beliefs and anxiety
(hypothesis 5). The directional relationship in this mediator model was examined by
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reversing the independent and dependent variables in another mediator model, so that
emotion controllability beliefs was the dependent variable and anxiety was the
independent variable. The mediator model remained significant, and cognitive reappraisal
partially mediated the effect of depression on emotion controllability beliefs.
The sixth mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anxiety, the
independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and a mediator of expressive
suppression (Figure 6). Total effect: the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on
depression was significant, b = -.64, t(302) = -6.27, p < .001. Indirect effects: the
regression of emotion controllability beliefs on expressive suppression was significant, b
= -.18, t(303) = -2.04, p = .04. Expressive suppression did not mediate the relationship
between emotion controllability beliefs and anxiety, indirect effect = -.03, SE = .02, 95%
CI [-.07, .01]. These results do not support the hypothesis that expressive suppression
would partially mediate the relationship between emotion controllability beliefs and
anxiety (hypothesis 5).
The seventh mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anxiety, the
independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes, and a mediator of cognitive reappraisal
(Figure 7). Total effect: the regression of nonjudgmental attitudes on depression was
significant, b = -.45, t(302) = -11.48, p < .001. Indirect effects: the regression of
nonjudgmental attitudes on cognitive appraisal was significant, b = .17, t(303) = 2.86, p <
.01. Cognitive reappraisal partially mediated the relationship between nonjudgmental
attitudes and anxiety, indirect effect = -.03, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.05, -.004]. These results
support the hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would partially mediate the relationship
between nonjudgmental attitudes and anxiety (hypothesis 6). The directional relationship

31
in this mediator model was examined by reversing the independent and dependent
variables in another mediator model, so that nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions was
the dependent variable and anxiety was the independent variable. Cognitive reappraisal
did not mediate the effect of anxiety on nonjudgmental attitudes.
The eighth mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anxiety, the
independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes, and a mediator of expressive
suppression (Figure 8). Total effect: the regression of nonjudgmental attitudes on
depression was significant, b = -.45, t(302) = -11.48, p < .001. Indirect effects: the
regression of nonjudgmental attitudes on expressive suppression was significant, b = -.13,
t(303) = -3.52, p < .001. Expressive suppression did not mediate the relationship between
nonjudgmental attitudes and anxiety, indirect effect = -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI [-.03, .01].
These results do not support the hypothesis that expressive suppression would partially
mediate the relationship between nonjudgmental attitudes and anxiety (hypothesis 6).
Mediation analysis with anger as a dependent variable
The ninth mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anger, the
independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and a mediator of cognitive
reappraisal (Figure 9). Total effect: the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on
anger was significant, b = -1.44, t(302) = -8.01, p < .001. Indirect effects: the regression
of emotion controllability beliefs on cognitive appraisal was significant, b = .93, t(303) =
7.37, p < .001. Cognitive reappraisal did not mediate the relationship between emotion
controllability beliefs and anger, indirect effect = -.01, SE = .10, 95% CI [-.24, .17].
These results do not support the hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would partially
mediate the relationship between emotion controllability beliefs and anger (hypothesis 5).
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The tenth mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anger, the
independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and a mediator of expressive
suppression (Figure 10). Total effect: the regression of emotion controllability beliefs on
anger was significant, b = -1.44, t(302) = -8.01, p < .001. Indirect effects: the regression
of emotion controllability beliefs on expressive suppression was significant, b = -.18,
t(303) = -2.04, p = .04. Expressive suppression did not mediate the relationship between
emotion controllability beliefs and anger, indirect effect = -.09, SE = .06, 95% CI [-.21,
.01]. These results do not support the hypothesis that expressive suppression would
partially mediate the relationship between emotion controllability beliefs and anger
(hypothesis 5).
The eleventh mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anger, the
independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes, and a mediator of cognitive reappraisal
(Figure 11). Total effect: the regression of nonjudgmental attitudes on anger was
significant, b = -.73, t(302) = -10.06, p < .001. Indirect effects: the regression of
nonjudgmental attitudes on cognitive reappraisal was significant, b = .17, t(303) = 2.86, p
< .01. Cognitive reappraisal did not mediate the relationship between nonjudgmental
attitudes and anger, indirect effect = -.02, SE = .02, 95% CI [-.07, .01]. These results
support the hypothesis that cognitive reappraisal would partially mediate the relationship
between nonjudgmental attitudes and anger (hypothesis 6).
The twelfth mediator model consisted of the dependent variable of anger, the
independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes, and a mediator of expressive
suppression (Figure 12). Total effect: the regression of nonjudgmental attitudes on anger
was significant, b = -.73, t(302) = -10.06, p < .001. Indirect effects: the regression of
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nonjudgmental attitudes on expressive suppression was significant, b = -.13, t(303) = 3.52, p < .001. Expressive suppression partially mediated the relationship between
nonjudgmental attitudes and anger, indirect effect = -.05, SE = .02, 95% CI [-.11, -.01].
These results support the hypothesis that expressive suppression would partially mediate
the relationship between nonjudgmental attitudes and anger (hypothesis 6). The
directional relationship in this mediator model was examined by reversing the
independent and dependent variables in another mediator model, so that nonjudgmental
attitudes about emotions was the dependent variable and anger was the independent
variable. Expressive suppression did not mediate the effect of depression on
nonjudgmental attitudes.
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DISCUSSION
Traditional CBT and third-wave CBT are widely used treatment approaches for
various clinical disorders. Although these therapies share some similar features, they
address thoughts and emotions in unique ways. Specifically, traditional CBT and REBT
emphasize modifying irrational beliefs and cognitive distortions to reduce negative
emotions, whereas ACT emphasizes that thoughts and beliefs do not cause behaviors, and
acceptance of thoughts and emotions promotes psychological flexibility and the ability to
pursue behaviors that achieve valued ends (Ruiz, 2012; Arch et al., 2012). These
differences reflect distinct philosophical traditions that shape these therapies. Stoic
philosophy is foundational to traditional CBT, namely REBT, and Eastern philosophical
traditions have influenced the development of third-wave CBT, including ACT. The
present study addressed beliefs about emotions (emotion beliefs) that each therapy
emphasizes.
There are many different types of emotion beliefs that have recently been explored in
the psychology literature. Ford and Gross (2018) offer a framework for conceptualizing
emotion beliefs by categorizing emotion beliefs in two superordinate categories: beliefs
about whether emotions are controllable or uncontrollable (emotion controllability
beliefs) and beliefs about whether emotions are good or bad (emotion values). There is
theoretical and empirical support that suggests that emotion regulation mediates the
relationship between emotion beliefs and emotion outcomes (Ford & Gross, 2019;
Kneeland et al., 2016a; Ortner & Pennekamp, 2020). Research supports that emotion
regulation impacts psychological functioning; however, little research has examined
predictors of emotion regulation (e.g., emotion regulation strategies selected; Wilson,
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2019). Moreover, there is little research investigating relationships between emotion
beliefs and various types of emotions.
This study addressed these research gaps and explored emotion beliefs across a range
of emotions, including depression, anxiety, and anger. Specifically, this study examined
associations between emotion beliefs and depression, anxiety, and anger, and examine if
emotion beliefs predicted these different emotions. It was predicted that emotion
controllability beliefs would be negatively correlated with depression, anxiety, and anger
scores (hypothesis 1). The results of this study supported this hypothesis, as emotion
controllability beliefs were significantly negatively correlated with depression, anxiety,
and anger scores. These results suggest that malleable emotion controllability beliefs are
associated with positive psychological health in various emotion domains, including
depression, anxiety, and anger. These findings are consistent with some aspects of a Stoic
philosophy of emotions that is foundational to traditional CBT, including REBT. That is
more specifically, the idea that individuals can control emotional responses by changing
irrational thinking, which can lead to decreases in dysfunctional emotions.
It was also predicted that nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions would be
negatively associated with depression, anxiety, and anger scores (hypothesis 2). The
results of the study supported this hypothesis, as nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions
were significantly negatively correlated with depression, anxiety, and anger scores. These
results suggest that an acceptance-based approach to emotions might be relevant to
positive psychological health in various emotional experiences, including depression,
anxiety, and anger. These findings are theoretically consistent with theories of emotion
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underlying third-wave CBT interventions; namely, acceptance of emotions can improve
psychological well-being.
It was predicted that emotion control values would be negatively associated with
depression, anxiety, and anger scores (hypothesis 3). The results of this study did not
support this hypothesis; emotion control values did not significantly correlate with
depression, anxiety, or anger. This hypothesis examined emotion beliefs that are
theoretically consistent with third-wave CBT interventions; namely, efforts to control
negative emotions can lead to increased experiences of negative emotions. It is possible
that the measure used in the present study conflated efforts to control the experience of
negative emotions with efforts to control the expression of negative emotions, which
might have different associations with emotion experiences and well-being. The measure
of emotion control values used in the present study consisted of more items representing
the control of emotion expression than the control of emotion experiences. It is possible
that the tendency to modulate emotion expression is adaptive in a range of circumstances
and is valued by certain cultural or ethnic groups (Mauss et al., 2010). The ability to
modify emotional expressions might enable people to adapt flexibly to situational
demands in situations that might be rewarded or fulfilled (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Côté et
al., 2010). Côté and colleagues (2010) found that the ability to deliberately down-regulate
and up-regulate emotional reactions, as assessed objectively in a laboratory setting, was
associated with positive well-being and high socioeconomic status. It is possible that
people who conform to display rules in various settings are rewarded, whereas failing to
conform to these rules can have costs. Future research should further examine differences
between effective versus noneffective emotion control. In addition, future studies should
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distinguish between valuing control emotional experiences versus emotional expressions,
as these distinct emotion beliefs might have unique relationships with depression,
anxiety, and anger.
The present study also included an exploratory analysis to compare statistically
significant correlation coefficients between different emotion beliefs and emotion
domains. The purpose of this analysis was to identify if relationships between particular
emotion beliefs are significantly more correlated with emotion outcomes in comparison
to other emotion beliefs. These results demonstrated that nonjudgmental beliefs about
emotions had a significantly stronger correlation with depression than did emotion
controllability beliefs. Nonjudgmental beliefs had a stronger correlation with anxiety than
did emotion controllability beliefs. Finally, nonjudgmental beliefs had a stronger
correlation with anger than did emotion controllability beliefs. These results suggest that
nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions have a stronger relationship with depression,
anxiety, and anger than emotion controllability beliefs, and these beliefs might be an
important psychotherapy target. Future research should use experimental paradigms to
identify if one of these emotion beliefs is a more important mechanism of change for
different emotion domains (i.e., compare interventions for emotion controllability beliefs
and nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions).
It was also predicted that emotion controllability beliefs, nonjudgmental attitudes
about emotions, and emotion control values would significantly predict depression,
anxiety, and anger scores (hypothesis 4). This hypothesis was partially supported. When
controlling for relevant demographics (age, gender, and data source), emotion
controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes were significant negative predictors of
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depression. Emotion control values did not predict depression. When respondents
endorsed malleable emotion controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes about
emotions, they were more likely to endorse lower depression symptoms.
When controlling for demographic variables, emotion controllability beliefs,
nonjudgmental attitudes, and emotion control values were significant negative predictors
of anxiety. When respondents endorsed malleable emotion controllability beliefs and
nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, they were more likely to endorse lower anxiety
symptoms. When respondents endorsed that they valued controlling emotions, they were
more likely to endorse lower anxiety. The direction of the relationship between emotion
control values and anxiety was the opposite of the predicted relationship. This is
surprising given findings from past research examining emotion control and anxiety
disorders, namely social anxiety disorder. Past research demonstrates that individuals
with social anxiety endorse valuing emotion control (Goodman et al., 2020; Farmer &
Kashdan, 2012). When controlling for demographic variables, emotion controllability
beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes were negative predictors of anger. Emotion
controllability values did not predict anger. These findings suggest that general emotion
beliefs, particularly emotion controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes about
emotions, influence a range of emotion experiences and clinical outcomes.
Emotion controllability beliefs might have implications for emotion regulation, which
is central to psychopathology. The extended process model of emotion regulation posits
that there are three sequential valuation stages involved in the emotion regulation process
(Tull et al., 2020; Sheppes et al., 2015). The first stage is identification, which involves
emotion detection, evaluation, and decision to regulate emotions. The second phase is
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selection, which involves the identification of emotion regulation strategies, predicting
the success of strategies, and the decision to implement a strategy. The third phase is
implementation and involves choosing and implementing a strategy and translating it into
specific behaviors. Sheppes and colleagues (2015) postulate that emotion beliefs might be
particularly relevant in the identification stage of emotion regulation. Fixed emotion
controllability beliefs might be associated with negatively valuing a regulated state and
deciding not to actively engage in emotion regulation. Evaluating emotions as bad might
increase the likelihood of identifying the need to regulate at this initial stage (Ford &
Gross, 2019).
The present study examined the relationship between emotion beliefs and different
emotions and the potential mediating role of dispositional tendencies to emotion
regulation. My prediction was that cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression
would partially mediate the relationship between emotion controllability beliefs and
emotion outcomes (depression, anxiety, and anger; hypothesis 5). My other prediction
was that cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression would partially mediate the
relationship between nonjudgmental attitudes towards emotions and emotion outcomes
(depression, anxiety, and anger scores; hypothesis 6). These hypotheses were partially
supported. The effect of emotion controllability beliefs on depression was partially
mediated by cognitive reappraisal but was not mediated by expressive suppression. The
effect of nonjudgmental attitudes on depression was partially mediated by cognitive
reappraisal but was not mediated by expressive suppression. Specifically, malleable
emotion controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions predicted a
greater tendency to engage in cognitive reappraisal and lower depression.
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The effect of emotion controllability beliefs on anxiety was partially mediated by
cognitive reappraisal but was not mediated by expressive suppression. The effect of
nonjudgmental attitudes on anxiety was partially mediated by cognitive reappraisal but
was not mediated by expressive suppression. Specifically, malleable emotion
controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions predicted a greater
tendency to engage in cognitive reappraisal and lower anxiety. These findings support
hypotheses that individuals with malleable emotion controllability beliefs might engage
in early-stage, active emotion regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal to regulate
anxiety and sadness. These findings also support that individuals with nonjudgmental
attitudes about emotions might tend to engage in antecedent-focused emotion regulation
strategies. It is possible that emotion beliefs impact emotion regulation at an early stage
of the emotion generative process, and they might not consistently predict responsefocused emotion regulation strategies in response to depression and anxiety, including
expressive suppression (Gross, 2015; Kneeland et al., 2016a).
The relationships between emotion beliefs and anger are markedly different than
those between emotion beliefs, depression, and anxiety. The effect of emotion
controllability beliefs on anger was not mediated by cognitive reappraisal or expressive
suppression, although there was a significant direct effect of emotion controllability
beliefs on anger. Nonjudgmental attitudes on anger were mediated by expressive
suppression but not cognitive reappraisal. Specifically, nonjudgmental attitudes
negatively predicted the tendency to use expressive suppression and anger. Further
research should explore relationships between emotion beliefs and anger and the
mechanisms by which emotion beliefs have on influencing anger. It is possible that
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emotion beliefs might predict other emotion regulation strategies that down-regulate
anger, including interpersonal emotion regulation skills. Future research should examine
relationships between emotion beliefs, anger, and a larger repertoire of emotion
regulation strategies.
The present study demonstrates that both emotion controllability beliefs and
nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions predict depression, anxiety, and anger. In sum,
emotion beliefs that are theoretically relevant to traditional CBT, including REBT, and
emotion beliefs that are relevant to third wave CBT, including ACT, similarly predict
psychological distress in a range of emotion domains. It is possible that both of these
emotion beliefs are important targets in psychotherapy and other interventions. CBT
addresses and aims to improve the execution of emotion regulation strategies (Sheppes et
al., 2015). It is possible that identifying and challenging fixed emotion controllability
beliefs and judgmental attitudes about emotions in psychotherapy would engender
increased willingness to engage in CBT interventions and implement CBT strategies.
Moreover, future research should examine brief interventions that target emotion
controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions. Research on implicit
beliefs of intelligence indicates that simple, short-term interventions can have longlasting effects (Aronson et al., 2002; Good et al., 2003; Blackwell et al., 2007; De
Castella et al., 2013). For example, some research has demonstrated that interventions
including workshops and teaching modules can be valuable in teaching incremental
theories of intelligence and changing individuals’ theories of intelligence. Future research
should examine the development and effectiveness of brief interventions for emotion
beliefs.
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The ability to navigate different emotions that arise is a marker of psychological
health and well-being (Kneeland et al., 2016b). Difficulty regulating emotions has been
associated with depression, chronic worry, and substance use. Moreover, research and
theory support that emotion regulation is a transdiagnostic process that is the core of
multiple forms of psychopathology (Aldao et al., 2016; Wilson, 2019). Malleable
emotion controllability beliefs and nonjudgmental attitudes might change the way
individuals think about emotion-eliciting events (cognitive reappraisal), which might
subsequently reduce depression or anxiety. Although the present study elucidates one
way emotion beliefs might impact depression and anxiety (via cognitive appraisal), how
emotion beliefs operate in relation to anger is less clear. Future research should further
examine the directionality of the relationship between emotion beliefs and anger.
Limitations and Future Directions
In future research, it would be beneficial to replicate this study in clinical
populations with depression, anxiety, or anger problems. Additionally, it would be
important to examine how the relationship between emotion beliefs and emotion
outcomes might be moderated by cultural factors. In Western or individualist cultures,
high arousal emotions are promoted, and in Eastern or collectivist cultures, low arousal
emotions are valued (Lim, 2016). These values might have implications for both emotion
experiences and motivation to engage in emotion regulation. Moreover, the expression of
emotions can be disruptive to social harmony and might demonstrate assertiveness (Ford
& Mauss, 2015). Cultural factors, including collectivism, individualism, and gender
identity should be further examined in relation to emotion beliefs.
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One limitation of this study is that dispositional tendencies related to emotion and
emotion regulation are assessed, which assume that individuals use certain emotion
regulation strategies consistently across different contexts. However, it is possible that a
range of factors influence emotion regulation within a short time frame, including
interpersonal and situational factors (Lavendar et al., 2017). Although past research
supports that there are reliable differences in trait emotion regulation between individuals
and that these differences predict patterns of psychopathology, contextual factors can
influence implementation of emotion regulation strategies (Maxwell et al., 2018). The
present study examined participants’ general tendencies to regulate emotions, but the
study was limited by not accounting for variability over time and situational factors.
Another limitation of this study was that these data were correlational. Experimental
designs examining emotion beliefs, emotion regulation, and emotion outcomes might
more adequately inform the direction the relationships examined.

** p < .001

Intercorrelations for dependent variables.

Table 1
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Table 2
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting depression from age, gender, data source,
emotion controllability beliefs, nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and emotion
control values.
Predictor Variables
B
S.E. B
β
R2
Adj.
F for
R2
change
in R2
Model 1
.09
.08
6.17***
**
Age
-.15
.05
-.25
Mturk
-.71
1.54
-.04
Social media
1.96
1.30
.10
Male
-4.46
2.68
-.30
Female
-3.14
2.61
-.22
Model 2
.37
.35
42.62***
Age
-.02
.05
-.04
Mturk
-1.18
1.30
-.07
Social media
.15
1.11
.01
Male
-3.33
2.26
-.22
Female
-2.04
2.20
-.14
Emotion controllability
-.26
.11
-.12
*
beliefs
Nonjudgmental
-.44
.05
-.50
***
attitudes
Emotion control values
-.58
.32
-.09
Note. B = Unstandardized regression coefficient. S.E. = Standard Error. ß =
Standardized regression coefficient. * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

46
Table 3
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting anxiety from age, gender, data source,
emotion controllability beliefs, nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and emotion
control values.
Predictor Variables
B
S.E. B
β
R2
Adj.
F for
R2
change
in R2
Model 1
.10
.09
6.81***
***
Age
-.17
.05
-.30
Mturk
.01
1.43
.00
Social media
1.56
1.20
.09
Male
-4.27
2.48
-.31
Female
-3.26
2.42
-.24
Model 2
.40
.39
49.76***
Age
-.05
.04
-.10
Mturk
-.41
1.17
-.03
Social media
-.10
1.00
-.01
Male
-2.98
2.05
-.21
Female
-2.15
1.99
-.16
Emotion controllability
-.34
.10
-.18
***
beliefs
Nonjudgmental
-.40
.04
-.50
***
attitudes
Emotion control
-.63
.29
-.10
*
values
Note. B = Unstandardized regression coefficient. S.E. = Standard Error. ß =
Standardized regression coefficient. * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Table 4
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting anger from age, gender, data source,
emotion controllability beliefs, nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and emotion
control values.
Predictor Variables
B
S.E. B
β
R2
Adj.
F for
R2
change
in R2
Model 1
.05
.04
3.45**
***
Age
-.33
.09
-.34
Mturk
4.99
2.57
.18
Social media*
4.67
2.16
.15
Male
-4.23
4.46
-.17
Female
-4.83
4.35
-.20
Model 2
.35
.34
46.12***
*
Age
-.16
.08
-.17
*
Mturk
4.56
2.14
.16
Social media
2.39
1.83
.08
Male
-1.42
3.73
-.06
Female
-2.56
3.62
-.11
Emotion controllability
-.99
.17
-.29
***
beliefs
Nonjudgmental
-.58
.08
-.41
***
attitudes
Emotion control values
-.05
.53
-.01
Note. B = Unstandardized regression coefficient. S.E. = Standard Error. ß =
Standardized regression coefficient. * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Figure 1
Mediation model 1; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent
variable of depression, independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and
mediator of cognitive reappraisal. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of
emotion controllability beliefs on depression. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the
direct effect of emotion controllability beliefs on depression. *p<.05, **p<.01,
***p<.001.

Cognitive Reappraisal
a = .93 (.13)***

Emotion controllability
beliefs

b = -.13 (.05)*
c = -.47 (.12)***
c’ = -.59 (.11)***

Depression
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Figure 2
Mediation model 2; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent
variable of depression, the independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and
the mediator of expressive suppression. The c path coefficient represents the total effect
of emotion controllability beliefs on depression. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the
direct effect of emotion controllability beliefs on depression. *p<.05, **p<.01,
***p<.001.

Expressive
Suppression
a = -.18 (.09)*

Emotion controllability
beliefs

b = .20 (.07)**
c = -.59 (.11)***

Depression

c’ = -.55 (.11)***

Figure 3
Mediation model 3; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of depression, independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions,
and mediator of cognitive reappraisal. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of
nonjudgmental attitudes on depression. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct
effect of nonjudgmental attitudes on depression. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Cognitive Reappraisal
a = .17 (.06)**

Nonjudgmental
attitudes

b = -.13 (.04)**
c = -.47 (.04)***
c’ = -.45 (.04)***

Depression
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Figure 4
Mediation model 4; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of depression, independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions,
and mediator of expressive suppression. The c path coefficient represents the total effect
of nonjudgmental attitudes on depression. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the
direct effect of nonjudgmental attitudes on depression. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Expressive
Suppression
a = -.13 (.04)***

Nonjudgmental
attitudes

b = .11 (.06)
c = -.47 (.04)***
c’ = -.47 (.04)***

Depression
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Figure 5
Mediation model 5; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anxiety, independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and mediator
of cognitive reappraisal. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of emotion
controllability beliefs on anxiety. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect of
emotion controllability beliefs on anxiety. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Cognitive Reappraisal
a = .93 (.13)***

Emotion controllability
beliefs

b = -.14 (.05)**
c = -.64 (.10)***
c’ = -.51 (.11)***

Anxiety

Figure 6
Mediation model 6; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anxiety, independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and mediator
of expressive suppression. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of emotion
controllability beliefs on anxiety. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect of
emotion controllability beliefs on anxiety. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Expressive
Suppression
a =-.18 (.09)*

Emotion controllability
beliefs

b = .14 (.07)*
c = -.64 (.10)***
c’ = -.62 (.10)***

Anxiety
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Figure 7
Mediation model 7; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anxiety, independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and
mediator of cognitive reappraisal. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of
nonjudgmental attitudes on anxiety. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect
of nonjudgmental attitudes on anxiety. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Cognitive Reappraisal
a = .17 (.06)**

Nonjudgmental
attitudes

b = -.17 (.04)***
c = -.45 (.04)***
c’ = -.42 (.04)***

Anxiety

Figure 8
Mediation model 8; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anxiety, independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and
mediator of expressive suppression. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of
nonjudgmental attitudes on anxiety. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect
of nonjudgmental attitudes on anxiety. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Expressive
Suppression
a =-.13 (.04)***

Nonjudgmental
attitudes

b = .06 (.06)
c = -.45 (.04)***
c’ = -.44 (.04)***

Anxiety
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Figure 9
Mediation model 9; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anger, independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and mediator
of cognitive reappraisal. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of emotion
controllability beliefs on anger. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect of
emotion controllability beliefs on anger. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Cognitive Reappraisal
a = .93 (.13)***

Emotion controllability
beliefs

b = -.01 (.08)
c = -1.44 (.18)***
c’ = -1.43 (.20)***

Anger

Figure 10
Mediation model 10; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anger, independent variable of emotion controllability beliefs, and mediator
of expressive suppression. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of emotion
controllability beliefs on anger. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect of
emotion controllability beliefs on anger. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Expressive
Suppression
a = -.18 (.09)*

Emotion controllability
beliefs

b = .49 (.11)***
c = -1.44 (.18)***
c’ = -1.35 (.18)***

Anger
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Figure 11
Mediation model 11; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anger, independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and
mediator of cognitive reappraisal. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of
nonjudgmental attitudes on anger. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect
of nonjudgmental attitudes on anger. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Cognitive Reappraisal
a = .17 (.06)**

Nonjudgmental
attitudes

b = -.13 (.07)
c = -.73 (.07)***
c’ = -.71 (.07)***

Anger

Figure 12
Mediation model 12; a, b, c and c’ are path coefficients representing
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors (in parentheses). Dependent
variable of anger, independent variable of nonjudgmental attitudes about emotions, and
mediator of expressive suppression. The c path coefficient represents the total effect of
nonjudgmental attitudes on anger. The c-prime path coefficient refers to the direct effect
of nonjudgmental attitudes on anger. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Expressive
Suppression
a = -.13 (.04)***

Nonjudgmental
attitudes

b = .39 (.11)***
c = -.73 (.07)***
c’ = -.68 (.07)***

Anger
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